Introduction
If conditions change after parties enter into a contract, one of them might want to be excused from performance, or at least have its obligations revised. AngloAmerican law provides the disadvantaged party with a number of defenses which would extinguish that party's obligations -impossibility, frustration, impracticability, and mutual mistake. Although there are some technical distinctions between these, for analytical convenience I will hereafter lump them all together under the impossibility rubric. My purpose in this essay is to explore some problems that have arisen in determining the appropriate scope of the impossibility defense.
The importance of the impossibility defense is circumscribed by the ability of the parties to contract around the law. If the law were too liberal in excusing performance, the parties could narrow the range of acceptable excuses by explicit contractual language. Conversely, if the law were too niggardly, the parties could enumerate additional circumstances that would justify discharge of the contractual obligations. If the law were badly out of line in either direction, the problems could be vitiated by proper drafting of force majeure clauses. Such clauses, which are very common, will suspend or disscharge a promisor's obligations for "acts of God". * * Part of the research for this paper was conducted while the author was a visiting professor at Washington University (St. Louis) and Columbia University. Helpful comments were provided by Christopher Bruce, Janis Powell, and participants at workshops at Washington University, Columbia University, and the Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin, as well as by participants at the Conference.
1 Most of the acts of God that are enumerated in such clauses are beyond the control of the contracting parties. There is one significant exception to this generalization. The clauses typically include strikes by the employees of either party. The purpose of this strike exception is, clearly, to protect the contracting parties from the threat of hold up in their dealings with labor. Thus, in the absence of such a clause the possibility that a firm would be liable for damages for breach of contract would weaken its bargaining position vis a vis the union.
Indeed, it should not really matter whether we frame the problem in terms of implementing the parties' decision ("Does the fire constit of God that excuses performance as per the initial agreement?") or of ing the conditions that would justify excusing performance ("Do make performance impossible?"). Even if a contract had no for clause, a court might infer that the parties would have included on thought of it. 2 That is, instead of recognizing an impossibility def courts could achieve the same result by interpretation of a force maj express or implied.
Regardless of how the doctrine is labelled, courts, when consideri to excuse performance, should be constrained by the fundamental q what would the parties have chosen? I will argue that, as a general ru would not agree to excuse performance because of changed market (neither supply nor demand shocks). The fact that market prices ha or tripled would be irrelevant. 3 Parties are more likely to excuse per if the supervening events adversely effect the costs of performing th contract for reasons that are essentially unrelated to overall market This argument implies that relative risk aversion as such has noth with the question. Analyses which center on this concept -Perloff Polinksy [1987] -would be largely beside the point. Other analyses i relative risk aversion plays a less central role - Posner and Rosenfie Joskow [1977] , Bruce [1982] , and Narasimhan [1986] -are, to a lesser similarly tainted.
The paper is organized as follows. In the first section I present an e of why reasonable businessmen would choose to excuse performance changed circumstances, but not others. In the remainder of the pap analyze specific problems that have arisen in the impossibility c literature. The explanation forwarded in Section 1 will play a promi in much ofthat discussion. Largely because their paper stimulated my on the problem, I will contrast my analysis of some of the specific c 2 Posner and rosenfield [1977, p. 107] provide an example of such creativ tation in an impossibility decision. In Snipes Mountain Co. v. Benz Bros Wash. 334, 298 P. 714 (1931) , the contract was for delivery of a crop that wa prior to delivery. The contract did not mention that the crop should be specific piece of land. Nonetheless, the court allowed an equitable action to contract so that the land was mentioned. The court then discharged the c a discussion of why courts discharge contracts for crops grown on specific la Section 2.2) It would have been just as easy to say: despite the fact that there majeure clause in the contract, we presume that the parties meant to include such a clause would have excused performance. J 1 his is not to say that parties would never adjust the contract price, f rice in the face of changed market conditions are commonplace. But the gran concession often expects a quid pro quo, either express (e.g., an increase in the contract) or implied (e.g., enhanced good will). The grantor, that is, m right to make (or not make) price concessions.
of Posner and Rosenfield [1977] . I will not, law, the reasoning underlying the case law,
Why Excuse Performance?
Many contracts include a force majeure clau obligation if, for example, his factory were to deliver for other reasons, perhaps becaus where, he would not be excused. Why would excuse performance for the first reason but first that not all contracts would discharge first situation. If the subject matter of the c would be less likely to provide for discharg agrees to pay $ 1000 for an item. His wallet flames. It is unlikely that the parties would this ground since there is no reason to pres in any way with performance of this contr Smith poorer, but does not otherwise impair He simply substitutes other dollars for those cash, Smith had lost a ton of a fungible comm that fungible commodity had burnt down, need to produce the commodity; he can m buying it on the open market.
Let us consider, then, a contract for del fungible commodity from the seller, Smith, does not perform and remains liable for dam damages and ascertain the reasonableness of some of the same problems that arise with m Because the good is not fungible, the buyer goods with which to cover. If Brown bears to choose the most efficient substitute. If, h Brown's incentive to economize is weaker. F was purchasing a computer system. His cho system that Smith had promised include on hardware and somewhat inferior software and aftersale services. A second alternative has the opposite features and is considerably more expensive. If Brown had to pay out of his own pocket, he would choose the superior hardware at the lower price. If, however, the costs were to be borne by Smith, Brown would choose the latter.
4 As Posner and Rosenfield [1977, p. 118] suggest, the decisions are often more satisfactory than the justifications.
3 A common ground for denying a request for specific performance is that supervision or enforcement would be difficult; see Farnsworth [1982, p. 822] . This is a routine moral hazard problem. The greater the moral haz greater the joint costs of the parties. It might appear that non-disch be good for Brown -he receives more than he initially bargained for. would be correct if we begin the analysis at the time at which Smith able to perform, it is not correct if we begin at the contract form Since in the long run the sellers must cover their costs, the costs of m will be reflected in the price of the goods. In this indirect way do share in the costs.
If not excusing the seller would result in these increased costs, why would flush right contracting parties ever fail to excuse? The reason is that there are benefits from holding sellers to agreements. While these benefits will generally outweigh the costs, they are likely to be much lower in the event of the occurrence of a condition covered by a. force majeure clause. If the plant for building a particular machine burns down or a farmer's entire carrot crop is destroyed, the overall market conditions do not change, although the costs of the individual producer do. If the occurrence of the particular event is uncorrelated with market conditions, then the expected value of the change in price between the date of contract formation and the date of the occurrence is zero. If the seller were excused, the buyer would gain when the market price fell and lose when it rose; leaving consequential damages aside, those two effects should roughly wash out. 6 That is, the buyer's expected damages from this source at the contract formation stage are low. The actual damages could turn out to be very high, however. 7
The crucial point is this. If the occurrence of & force majeure condition is not correlated with market conditions, the expected change in market price is zero, and therefore, the benefits anticipated at the contract formation stage from holding the promisor liable are likely to be low. However, if the seller refuses to perform because events subsequent to the formation of the contract have shown that the contract price is too low, the buyer does suffer. If the seller could perform, but would prefer not to, we can reasonably infer that the reason is that the contract price is too low; the seller could do better selling elsewhere. The changed conditions affect the market for the good or service involved. There is a widespread drought, the Suez Canal closes, etc. Discharging the contract in this instance carries a greater cost. If a seller could be excused simply because the contract price was below the market price, the substantial benefits from 6 If the buyer could have recovered consequential damages that would arise because a substitute performance could not be completed until after the original performance was due, then discharge could be expensive for the buyer. The analysis is cleaner where it is clear that consequential damages would not be granted. When damages from delay are anticipated, a force majeure clause would be likely to suspend the seller's obligation, rather than terminate it.
' One cost of excusing performance is that the existence of ajorce majeure condition is a question of fact which could be costly to litigate. The greater the contract versus market differential, the greater the incentive to allege the existence of such a condition.
entering into a contract in a timely mann might be acceptable in some cases, it is cle performance when the contract price is t performance in the event of a fire or oth Thus, it is at least plausible that contract excuse a seller in the event of a fire or sim on other grounds. It should be emphasize seller to get off scot-free. If a fire destro is discharged, it still bears all the costs of risk of a subsequent price change and a also be noted that the "impossibility" label for the seller to perform what had been p him to pay the expectation damages. All h justification for discharge is that the expec formation stage is likely to be low com holding the seller liable.
The Cases
In the remainder of the paper, I want to consider four problems discussed by Posner and Rosenfield. While we generally agree on the outcomes, we differ on the rationale. I rely on the analysis in the previous section to determine whether performance should be excused in three of the cases. The one exception is the Coronation cases which are most usefully analyzed as option contracts. The one outcome on which I part company with both Posner and Rosenfield and modern Anglo-American law is not a matter of whether performance should be excused. Rather, it concerns problems that arise if performance is excusedrestitution of payments made by the buyer and compensation for costs incurred by the seller in reliance on the contact.
2.Í The Suez Cases
In 1956 and again in 1967, military operations in the Middle East closed Suez Canal to shipping traffic. Parties that had entered into contracts before canal was closed found that completing performance would be consider more expensive. Carriers and sellers who had promised to deliver goods at fixed price attempted to avoid their contractual obligations. In most instan the courts enforced the contracts. In Transatlantic Financing Corp. v. Unit States, 8 for example, a shipowner argued that its contract with the Unite States to transport wheat from the U.S. to Iran was discharged by the clos of the Suez Canal. Posner and Rosenfield [1977, pp. 103-105 ] arg court's refusal to discharge the contract was correct:
. . . [T] he decision on whether to discharge the contract turn[s] on an examin key economic parameters that we have identified. The shipowner is the su bearer because he is better able to estimate the magnitude of the loss (a funct and of the value and nature of the cargo, which are also known to the shi the probability of the unexpected event. Furthermore, shipowners who own and are engaged in shipping along several different routes can spread the ris on any particular route without purchasing market insurance or forcing thei ers to diversify their common-stock portfolios. And the shipping compan desired, purchase in a single transaction market insurance covering multiple course, the shipper in the particular case -the United States Governmen diversified too, but decision should (and here did) turn on the characteristic as a class, if an unduly particularistic analysis is to be avoided.
Perusal of current shipping contracts indicates that the basic ship contracts were not altered after the Suez decisions. Closing of the C an enumerated excuse in force majeure clauses. Hence, it would appe courts got it right. The Posner-Rosenfield explanation, howeve work. To see this, consider a closely related problem. How would th a shipping contract deal with the possibility that the port of destina be closed by a blockade? The reasons given in the previous parag apply at least as well to this problem. Nevertheless, ocean shipping routinely include language that would discharge the carrier in this Why would the parties agree to excuse the carrier in the event of of the port of destination, but not excuse in the event that the Su blockaded? To make the analysis even crisper, suppose that in both these are executory contracts. That is, the parties entered into the before the supervening event had occurred, but had not loaded the the ship. Consider first the blockade of the single port. The costs of goods to the original destination increase. If the carrier were to att deliver by sea it incurs the increased risk of loss due to destruction or cargo. If it attempted to get the goods to the port by other mean over land or substituting other goods for the goods named in t contract) it would also incur additional costs. It is not at all cle promisee would want these additional costs to be incurred if it had costs out of its own pocket. Discharging the contract puts that que promisee directly. The supervening event raises the costs of perfor particular contract. But there is no reason to believe that there wo effect on the market price of ocean shipping generally. This is a clas of the case discussed in the previous section in which the occu supervening event is uncorrelated with market conditions. Since at t formation stage the expected change in the market price of shippi due to the blockade of a destination port is approximately zero, the holding the promisor liable should be low. This is not true for the closing of the Suez. Th substantial impact on the market price for ocea a large increase in the short-term demand for when coupled with the short-term inelasticity o prices more than doubling. The fact that the jou than originally anticipated is irrelevant. The key cost of the ship has increased. Excusing the pro supervening event is correlated with market cond both parties.
It is worth noting in passing that the non-discharge of the contracts does not mean that all the contracts will be performed. The changed circumstances do not affect all shippers equally. There will be a reallocation of shipping services with the ships tending to go to the highest bidders. Non-discharge means that the beneficiaries of the windfall are those who happened to sign contracts before the Canal closing was anticipated. Discharge would give the windfall to the owners of the vessels.
Agricultural Goods
Suppose a farmer promises to deliver carrots. The crop is destroyed by a flood and the farmer asks that the contractual obligation be discharged. The general rule has been that if the contract called for delivery of crops from this particular farm, then the farmer would be excused. Otherwise, he would not. Posner and Rosenfield [1977, pp. 106-107] suggest that the explicit identification of the crops with a particular plot of land is irrelevant by itself; however, it generally leads to the right decision since it serves as a proxy for the distinction between a farmer and a wholesaler, the latter being better able to diversify risks.
The result is both consistent and efficient; it places the risk of extreme weather conditions on the superior risk bearer. The purchaser from the grower can reduce the risk of adverse weather by diversifying his purchases geographically; there is empirical evidence to suggest that in some climatic regions geographical separation of only a few miles can dramatically reduce the risk of a large loss. When the seller is a wholesaler or large dealer there is no reason to allow discharge since he can diversify his purchases and thereby eliminate the risk of adverse weather.
To see why the seller's ability to diversify is not the critical factor, let us assume initially that the farmer is producing a homogeneous product. (This assumption is implicit in the Posner-Rosenfield analysis; as we shall see, a
proper resolution of the matter requires that we drop the assumption.) If his crop were destroyed, he could purchase a substitute on the open market and meet his obligations in that way. Regardless of whether or not he is excused, the farmer bears the entire risk of the destruction of his crop. The impossibility defense only concerns the additional risk of a price rise occurring between the time the contract was entered into and when performance was due. If the farmer had assumed this risk in the initial contract, why should the risk be shifted when his crop was destroyed?9 Why should the parties distinguish betwe in which the farmer produces the goods and then must sell them at price less than the market price and the case in which the farmer fail the goods and must buy them on the market at a high price and re contract price?
Posner und Rosenfield have concentrated on the wrong factor. Dif attitudes toward risk do not explain why performance is more l excused when the contract specifies the land on which the crop is to A simple question to ask is: why would a contract specify that t produced on a particular piece of land? A plausible answer would be parties are doing this to distinguish the crop from others. That is, not homogeneous ; by specifying that the carrots be grown on a par of land, the parties are conveying some information about the expec of the carrots.
My knowledge of agricultural markets is meager and unsystematic, and I do not want to become embroiled in a debate over the extent of quality variation in various markets. But I think it is quite clear that quality does vary and that the identity of the supplier can be quite important in some instances. This is obviously true for wine grapes. And it is also true for many fruits and vegetables. Indeed, in some instances canners will provide seeds for certain varieties to selected growers. 10
Thus, if the carrots are destroyed by an act of God and such acts are expected to be uncorrelated with changes in market prices, we have the type of situation described in the previous section. The anticipated rewards to holding the promisor to the contract are low while the costs of holding him to the contract given the difficulties in reckoning damages and evaluating the reasonableness of the buyer's mitigation (cover) can be high. 1 i Notice that it is not even necessary for the contract to include an explicit excuse clause. If the contract quantity depends upon the amount actually grown, then any shortfall from the expected crop is automatically excused. That is, if the buyer agrees to take all the carrots produced (or a pro rata share) and 9 Bruce [1982, pp. 331-32] hints at this; his discussion gets bogged down in some extraneous considerations of insurance.
10 See Flath [1980, p. 183] . In some instances courts might find that, if a grower breaches, the lack of close substitutes would force the buyer to incur consequential damages. In Campbell Soup Co. v. Wentz, 172 F. 2d (1948) , a grower of a special variety of carrots (grown from Campbell's seeds) breached his supply contract. The court held that the carrots were sufficiently unique to merit granting Campbell specific performance.
(Specific performance was denied, however, since the court misunderstood the force majeure clause and held it unconscionable; the court then argued that a party that included such a nasty clause in a contract did not deserve specific performance.)
11 The force majeure clause in Campbell v. Wentz did excuse the grower if the carrot crop was destroyed.
bad weather results in fifty percent of the cr in effect, excused from delivering the remain At the opposite extreme, consider a wholesa of many farmers and then sells a product of problem in this instance is trivial. Even if h meet his obligations by buying and tenderin having the promisor cover or of reckoning to be outweighed by the benefits of providin be enforced. Thus, in this instance it is less l a force majeure clause in the contract. When I presented an earlier version of this uncautiously characterized the preceding argu In contracts in which the particular supplier' expect to find force majeure clauses. Where g available, we should not find the clauses. Pro ed out that a number of form contracts for include force majeure clauses, and he graciou Careful consideration of one of these contra my argument, so long as the conclusions are terms. The North American Export Grain A delivery of fungible grain from an elevator t contains a number of interesting features. Fi in the event that the buyer fails to take deliv over the accuracy of damage measuremen eliminates the moral hazard problem. Second, traded like a futures contract rather than 12 In Campbell v. Wentz, Campbell agreed to twelve tons per acre). The open-ended quantity Suppose that at harvest time the contract price marginal cost of harvesting is upward sloping, underspend in harvesting because he does not fully be the case if the contract was for a fixed quantit Consider a farmer whose fields are flooded. He mi and the amount salvaged will depend upon the am exceeded the contract price, the farmer has an i mitigation) and invoke the excuse. If monitoring of the availability of the excuse can result in the far the flood because the bulk of the rewards to his s 13 The contract is described in detail in Slabot 14 Clause 18 sets the damages at the difference b plus daily carrying costs (a blank term to be filled further expressly agreed that carrying charges as the nature of liquidated damages and, as such, that required in substantiation thereof." expected, the excuse clause does not apply. 15 Third, the excuse clau ative only for a few specified causes which make it difficult for the ship the grain : strikes, exceptional impediments to transportation, a by governmental authorities. 16 A fire in the seller's warehouse excuse performance. In sum, the grain contract is consistent with th have sketched. The contract is not excused under any circumstances i had not been anticipated. Even if delivery had been anticipated, the c not excused if fungible grain is destroyed. It would, however, be exc costs of loading at a particular location increase just as the contract t the grain would be excused if the port of delivery was closed. 17
The Coronation Cases
In anticipation of the procession to be held in connection with the coronation of Edward VII, rooms were rented along the route at high prices. Edward's appendicitis forced the cancellation of the procession and considerable litigation ensured. In Krell v. Henry1* it was held that the cancellation of the procession frustrated the purpose of the contract and that the renter was discharged from the contract. He did not have to make payments that were due after the procession had been cancelled. Since he had withdrawn his cross-claim for restitution of funds already paid before the cancellation, the court did not have to deal with that issue. In Chandler v. Webster 19 the court ruled that there could be no recovery for money that had been paid before the cancellation; furthermore, the renter would be liable for any money due before the cancellation but not yet paid. This result has been subjected to considerable criticism.
Professors Dawson and Harvey [1969, p. 636] , for example, state that "the absurdity of this solution is apparent." I think that the decisions are not absurd. Before I begin the analysis, I should point out that the Coronation cases are one-shot deals between amateurs. These are the sorts of cases that law professors love. One can play a lot of games attempting to divine how the parties might have dealt with the problem had they thought about it. There are few constraints upon the imagination. As such, these are terrible cases on which to build a commercial jurisprudence. There are, however, many commercial situations in which similar problems arise and in which it would be possible to observe how parties routinely deal with the problem. If, for example, the Chicago Cubs lose in the playoffs, hotel reserva-15 In trade usage, a "circle" is a series of contracts in which each seller is also a buyer of the same quality goods at the same port in the same time period; each party to the circle "may agree to forego actual delivery and to participate in a clearing agreement for the settlement of contract price differences." (Clause 16) See Slabozky [1984, pp. 56-62] . It is useful to view the owner of the agreeing to make a series of payment position to exercise or not exercise th payment he decided that he did not really would rather see if from a different loc subsequent payment, thereby allowing th tion all money that was due prior to the Krell for performance of the contract. T not require that the contract be discharg performed with Henry simply allowing Now, the contract did not say that Henr state that, in the event that the coronati could refuse to make the payment due p liability. Nonetheless, I think it is reason would treat the problem if they dealt wit contemplating a vacation at a popular ski six months in advance. If she changed contract was silent on the matter, she amount. 20 But the contract would proba lodge would probably ask for a modest in tional non-refundable deposits at later da mind, her liability would only be for the be that she could walk away from her planned vacation date at a cost of only te Posner and Rosenfield [1977, pp. 110] ag discharged because of the lack of snow. T ability of the contracting parties to diver less able to diversify the risks than are t I doubt that the argument is correct since skiers to book alternate accomodations on about whether their assertion is correct; t The contract would most likely include a 20 There are some complications as to whethe would constitute mitigation of damages or w lost volume lessor. For analysis of the lost v Goldberg [1988, Part IV]. 144/1 (1988) Impossibility and Related Excuses 1 1 1 comes clear to the skier that snow conditions will be inadequate, she paying. There would be neither a breach nor a discharge. The magnitude of payments made by the skier will depend upon the timing of the decision popularity of the lodge, and so forth. If the contract did not require tha skier make any payments prior to showing up, then she would bear no liab I have not collected any systematic information on how ski lodges, hote and others handle these problems. Anecdotal evidence suggests that the opt are routinely sold. Hotels frequently require that someone booking a room for the first night in advance to assure reservations.21 Restaurants r charge a price for reservation, although some high-priced restaurants established a policy of billing no-shows. I am reasonably confident that a systematic canvassing would show that the use of options is very common that the judicial disposition of Krell and Chandler is consistent with what routinely done in the hotel business.
Customized Machinery
If a contract involves a machine that is to be constructed by the selle installed in the buyer's factory and that factory is destroyed by fire pri delivery, the contract would be discharged. The Anglo-American case law the Uniform Commercial Code both would excuse performance. Force maj clauses would also generally excuse the performance. There is less agreemen what should be done after the seller has been excused. Should the seller be compensated for costs incurred prior to the fire? Should the seller be required to return payments made by the buyer prior to the fire?
Let us begin with the simplest case. The fire occurred before the seller has started to perform and the buyer has made no payment. If the buyer was not excused, for what damages would he be liable? He would be liable for the change in the market value of the machine between the date at which the contract was formed and the instant at which he breached. 22 Since the fire at the buyer's factory is likely to be unrelated to overall market conditions for the machinery, the expected value of the price change is likely to be zero. By the argument of the previous section, it is unlikely that the benefits of holding the promisor to the contract would outweigh the costs. Posner and Rosenfield [1977, pp. 92-93, 105-106] and Bruce [1982, pp. 330-331 ] reach a similar 1 1 2 Victor P. Goldberg ΛΠΤΠΕ conclusion. They note that the seller is g salvage23 and that courts have correctly circumstances.
Curiously, Bruce [1982, pp. 323-324] argues that Taylor v. Caldwell1* was wrongly decided. That case, the "fountainhead of the modern law of impossibility" (Farnsworth [1982, p. 673] ) concerned a contract to perform in a music hall which was destroyed by fire less than a week prior to the scheduled performance date. But there is no practical distinction between that case and one in which the fire disrupted a contract for delivery of a machine rather than the delivery of a service. Bruce emphasizes the incentives for the music hall owner to control the likelihood of the occurrence of the fire. Note, however, that the music hall owner bears the direct costs of that fire; it is his music hall that burns down. The only damage issues in Taylor v. Caldwell concern the post-contractual change in the price of music hall services and the performer's reliance costs, consequential damages, and incidental damages. By excusing the music hall, the decision put the entertainer in exactly the same position as the manufacturer of machinery in the hypothetical.25
If the fire occurred after the seller had begun to perform, and if only some of the costs of performance were salvageable, then responsibility for these additional costs must be assigned. In the absence of specific contractual language, this raises two new damages issues: (a) Should there be restitution of any payments made by the party invoking the excuse? and (b) Should the innocent party be compensated for expenditures made in reliance on the contract?
Reliance would include the costs of acquiring inputs necessary for performance of this contract, costs incurred in performing the contract up to the point at which the breach occurred, and costs incurred in anticipation that the contract would be performed (e.g., establishing a network of retailers or initiating an advertising campaign). 26
Both of these issues present difficulties even in the case in which the buyer's failure to perform resulted from a deliberate decision on its part rather than an act of God that was presumably beyond its control. Thus, American courts 23 If the seller has not begun to perform or if salvage value were zero, then the relative ability to affect salvage would be irrelevant. There is a bit of confusion in the PosnerRosenfield analysis in that, they assume "the machine has no salvage value" (p. 92) and then argue that the "loss depended not only on the salvage value of the machine if the fire occurred after its completion but also on its salvage value at various anterior stages." (p. 93) 24 3 B. &S. 826, 122 Eng. Rep. 309 (1863) . 25 In the machinery hypothetical the costs of reliance and the consequential and incidental damages were assumed to be zero. The assumptions are relaxed in the next Daraeraoh. 26 In a case like Taylor v. Caldwell, the frustrated entertainer might have incurred travel expenses; he might also have foreclosed alternative employment opportunities for the period he had been scheduled to perform at the music hall. have in some instances ordered restitution to the breaching party of mon even where the breach was willful, rather than accidental or negligent. 27 if restitution were appropriate in the face of a willful breach, it should when a contingency beyond either party's control arises. Whether should award restitution to a willful breacher is a different question. I reasonable commercial contexts economics and common sense suggest t answer should be: No. I will return to this shortly, If the buyer breached, it is not at all clear that the manufacturer wo compensated for expenses incurred in anticipation of the sales contract performed. The law does not generally look kindly upon reliance losses consequential damages. Indeed, I argue elsewhere (Goldberg [1988] , Part III B) that American law has probably become too liberal in compensating these losses. I will not pursue that argument here. For my purposes it is sufficient to acknowledge the existence of a tradeoff. On the one hand, compensating the seller weakens his incentives to control costs before the contract is terminated. 28 On the other hand, a failure to compensate reliance expenditures might result in the seller's doing too little. How can these competing interests best be taken into account? A priori, we can't say. The question is too situationspecific. But that means that, to the extent possible, we should leave the balancing decision in the hands of the contracting parties. There are numerous contractual devices by which the seller could achieve some protection of its reliance. In particular, it could require interim payments from the buyer. The arrangement could be formalized with progress payments, as they are usually called, being required as the seller successfully completes particular phases of the project. If the contract was terminated prematurely (either deliberately or by an act of God) there would be no need to order restitution or to reckon the compensable reliance damages. By appropriately phasing their performance, the parties manage to balance their respective interests and to avoid wasteful litigation.
The questions of restitution and reliance are, therefore, interrelated. Prepayment should not be viewed as a mere happenstance. In serious commercial transactions, prepayment is a device for providing some protection of the reliance interest. 29 If customized goods are involved, phased payment should 27 See Farnsworth [1982, pp. 600-605, 8.14] . 28 Posner and Rosenfield [1977, pp. 93] emphasize the seller's control of costs in their argument that the contract should be discharged in the event of a fire in the buyer's plant.
Implicitly, at least, they are arguing that the relevant damages are reliance damages and they should be borne by the seller.
That is, of course, not the only purpose. As noted in the discussion of the Coronation cases, prepayment can be an effective way of creating options. Posner and Rosenfield [1977, p. 116] argue that because there are so many reasons for prepayment we should not presume that prepayment is related to the possible occurrence of an event which would result in discharge of the contract. Therefore, they favor a rule which provides restitution of prepaid money. be expected; the more unique the goods, the gre parties might find any particular contingen Nonetheless, a sensible rule for them to adopt of reasons why a particular contract might no protect one's interests is to assure that at each rendered and compensation received are not too ing restitution or attempting an independen courts undo the balancing of interests achieved Anglo-American law appears to be moving in t ler v. Webster, after being subjected to a consid overturned in England in Fibrosa Spolka Akcyj Barbour, Ltd. 32 In that case, the Polish plaintif be manufactured in England and delivered to P a down payment and the manufacturer had par when Germany invaded Poland, a condition wh contract. The House of Lords held that the plain the down payment, but that the defendant was the costs it had incurred; that issue, it asserted, to deal with. Shortly thereafter Parliament pass Contracts) Act33 which allowed for some recov The net result of the decision and subsequent l courts do their job well, they will manage, at c parties in roughly the same position the par became involved. That does not seem to be a
Concluding Remarks
The first tentative conclusion I want to draw from this exercise is a methodological one. Because uncertainty over the future is a central element of the impossibility problem, there is a great temptation to invoke attitudes toward risk (relative risk aversion) and the ability to diversify risks in analyzing the problem. I hope that I have demonstrated the fruitlessness of that approach. This is one more piece of evidence in the case I have been trying to make over 30 Klein [1980] notes that the parties might have rational reasons for having the benefits and costs diverge over time. If one party can use the threat of imposing high costs by terminating the contract, the parties might be better off because that threat can be used to discipline the potential loser. This possibility makes it even less likely that a court could intelligently determine how much restitution and reliance damages would be appropriate.
J1 On American law, see Restatement Contracts 2d 272 and Farnsworth [1982, pp. 702-704] . 32 1943 32 , A.C. 32. 33 1943 . the last few years against relying upon risk aversion to explain most co behavior or economic institutions generally. 34
The second conclusion is that the distinction between supervening c stances which affect market conditions and those which affect the costs of performing this particular contract is the key to understanding the case law and the decisions of the parties as to when performance should be excused. Market fluctuations, even beyond the range that reasonable men might have foreseen, are not a ground for discharging a contract. That does not mean that the parties will set the price term and accept any subsequent price changes as part of their bargain. They have a number of devices at their disposal for adjusting the contract price to changed market conditions -indexing being the most obvi-
The third conclusion is that private parties are pretty clever. 36 They do not use force majeure clauses indiscriminately. As the discussion of the grain contract indicated, the grounds on which a contract would be excused can be nicely tailored to industry conditions. Moreover, force majeure clauses are only one aspect of the private response. Business firms can set up their affairs to take into account the possibility that the contract might be terminated for any reason. Phasing performance with devices like progress payments can effectively protect the reliance interest of the performing party.
Finally, these points suggest that courts should be cautious when confronted with demands for discharge or demands for restitution in the event that a contract has been discharged. This does not mean that courts should never succumb to the demands. There is room for interpretation of ambiguities in force majeure clauses and of the intentions of the parties in the absence of such a clause. This is especially true as we move away from commercial contracts between repeat players toward contracts between amateurs. Courts should not, however, take the existence of ambiguities, real or contrived, as license to remake deals in pursuit of ex post fairness. The preceding analysis suggests the principles that should be used to fill the gaps in these contracts.
34 See Goldberg [1988] . I am not alone in my aversion to risk aversion for analyzing institutions; see also Barzel [1982] , Klein [1983], p. 370, and Williamson [1987] .
i:> In Goldberg [1985, pp. 531 -534] , I discuss the benefits of price adjustment and the mechanisms for achieving it.
36 Actually, individuals might be rather foolish and most people in the industry could probably not tell us what the excuse clause looked like and why it took the form that it did. The cleverness is in part that of a few lawyers and in part (I suspect a greater part) the result of market forces rewarding the good contracts and penalizing the bad.
